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Abstract
Dynamic Software Updating (DSU) is a technique of updating running software systems on-the-ﬂy. Whereas
there are some studies on the correctness of dynamic updating, they focus on how to deploy updates correctly
at the code level, e.g., if procedures refer to the data of correct types. However, little attention has been
paid to the correctness of the dynamic updating at the behavior level, e.g., if systems after being updated
behave as expected, and if unexpected behaviors can never occur. We present an algebraic methodology of
specifying dynamic updates and verifying their behavioral correctness by using oﬀ-the-shelf theorem proving
and model checking tools. By theorem proving we can show that systems after being updated indeed satisfy
their desired properties, and by model checking we can detect potential errors. Our methodology is general
in that: (1) it can be applied to three updating models that are mainly used in current DSU systems; and
(2) it is not restricted to dynamic updates for certain programming models.
Keywords: dynamic software updating, algebraic speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation, behavioral property
1 Introduction
Dynamic software updating (DSU) is a promising software maintenance technique
for updating running software systems on the ﬂy without incurring downtime. Like
repairing a machine that is operating at full speed, dynamic updates must be highly
reliable to guarantee the systems after being updated must behave as expected.
That is because target systems that need dynamic updating are usually mission-
critical. They need to provide 24x7 services, such as traﬃc control systems and
ﬁnancial transaction systems. Therefore, it is important to guarantee a dynamic
update is correct and it can be correctly performed to the target system.
Though several studies have been conducted on the correctness of dynamic soft-
ware updating, most of them consider the correctness at the code level [9,22,16],
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that is, how to correctly deploy dynamic updates, e.g., whether the updated pro-
grams remain type safe [9,22] or version consistent [22,16]. Type safety of dynamic
updates means that procedures will never refer to those data which have diﬀerent
types from their signatures. For instance, suppose that a data type A is updated
to A’ and there is a procedure f(A a) in the old version. After update f should
refer to those data of the new type A’ rather than those of A. Version consistency
means no bad calls between procedures of old and new versions. There may be such
a call between procedures that it happens neither in old version nor in the new one.
For instance, suppose that there are procedures f(){g();h();}, g(){...}, and
h(){...} in an old program. f and g are updated to f(){g();} and g(){h();}.
Suppose that the update takes place in old f before g is called. After update, new
g is called. New g calls h. After g returns, h is called by old f. Such a call should
be avoided during updating.
Though code-level correctness is necessary to dynamic updating, we believe that
the correctness on systems’ behaviors level is equally important. Even if an update
is correctly implemented at code level, such as type safe and version consistent,
it may not make a system behave as expected after the update is performed. A
dynamic update in Section 2 is such an example, where a system running a ﬂawed
mutual exclusion protocol is dynamically updated to a correct one. After being up-
dated, the system is supposed to satisfy two desired properties, i.e., mutual exclusion
and freedom of deadlock. However, the updated system satisﬁes mutual exclusion
property, but may cause deadlock. Such an update is not considered behaviorally
correct.
We propose an algebraic methodology of specifying dynamic updates and ver-
ifying their behavioral properties. Dynamic updates are modeled as observational
transition systems (OTSs), a kind of abstract state machines that are used to specify
computer systems in algebraic ways [19]. OTSs can be speciﬁed as equational the-
ories and rewrite theories which are used for theorem proving and model checking
[8,7], respectively. By theorem proving, we can show desired behavioral properties
are indeed satisﬁed by updated systems, and by model checking we ﬁnd counterex-
amples for those properties that do not hold. Counterexamples can help us better
understand the behavior of updated systems, detect the errors of dynamic updates,
and ﬁnally design correct ones.
Our method is general from the following two perspectives. Firstly, it can be
used to formalize three main dynamic updating models, i.e., interrupt model, in-
voke model, and relaxed consistency model (see Section 2.1 for details), which are
widely used in current dynamic software updating systems. We can formalize in
the methodology the dynamic updates that conform to one of the three models.
Secondly, we formalize the design of dynamic updates instead of the codes, which is
diﬀerent from other existing approaches e.g., the formalizations of dynamic updates
in C-like programs in [12] and [13]. Hence, our formalism is not restricted to the
dynamic updates that are developed in certain program models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces dynamic soft-
ware updating. Section 3 describes the approach to formalizing dynamic updates.
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Section 4 describes the veriﬁcation of behavioral correctness. Section 5 discusses
some related work, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Dynamic Software Updating
2.1 Dynamic updating models
Dynamic software updating is diﬀerent from static updating. The latter is a tra-
ditional approach to evolving software into newer versions by stopping running
systems, applying updates and then restarting systems again. However, dynamic
updating supports on-the-ﬂy updates to the running systems without shutting them
down.
A number of systems have been designed and implemented to support dynami-
cally updating software systems, such as Podus [10], OPUS [1], Ginseng [17], POLUS
[6]. They are speciﬁc to dynamic updates to certain class of software systems. For
instance, Ginseng supports dynamic updates to single-threaded systems, and PO-
LUS supports those to multi-threaded ones. Both only support dynamic updates
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Fig. 1. Three dynamic updating models
Behind dynamic updating systems are the updating models that determine
which kinds of dynamic updates they can support. Hicks et al. has grouped dy-
namic updating models into two groups according to the time when the updates
should be applied [14]. One is called interrupt model and the other is invoke model,
as visualized by the ﬁrst and second portions of Fig. 1. In interrupt model, an
update to a system could be started at any moment during the system’s execution.
The system is ﬁrst interrupted at some point. Then update is performed atomically,
and ﬁnally the system is resumed. The atomicity of performing the update means
that the update cannot be performed in parallel with program execution. Updates
are not necessarily performed at the moment of interruption. They may be delayed
until certain conditions are satisﬁed. For instance, some dynamic updating sys-
tems forbid updates to active code (code on the stack) [5]. Some systems delay the
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updates to active code until they are inactive [21]. However, the evolution to the
new system always occurs immediately upon the resumption of systems. A number
of dynamic updating systems are based on interrupt model, such as Podus [10],
Ginseng [17], and those in [5,21,20].
Unlike the interrupt model, the invoke model requires update points to be stat-
ically speciﬁed in systems. At update points, a special update procedure can be
invoked to perform updates. The running system is ﬁrst notiﬁed that it should per-
form an update. It invokes the update procedure when reaching an update point,
and the corresponding update is then performed. After the update procedure re-
turns, the system continues from where it left oﬀ. Invoke model well suits the
updates to multi-threaded systems. A typical example is Erlang, which supports
dynamic updating based on the invoke model [3].
Relaxed consistency model is an extension of interrupt model, as visualized by
the third portion in Fig. 1. It supports dynamic updates to multi-threaded systems.
The diﬀerence is that relaxed consistency model allows the concurrent activity of
both old and new systems and the co-existence of both old and new system states.
After update is performed and the running multi-threaded system is resumed, each
thread may not execute new codes immediately. Instead, it may continue to execute
old code and evolve to the new code at some speciﬁc point. Update is completed
when all threads evolve to the new code. Relaxed consistency model has been
implemented in POLUS [6].
2.2 Behavioral correctness of DSU
Behavioral correctness means that the behavior of the systems after being updated
must be correct. Formally, a dynamic update is behaviorally correct if the system
after being updated by it satisﬁes its desired properties. Such properties depend
on concrete systems, and usually describe the diﬀerences between the old and new
systems. For instance, version 1.1.2 of the vsftpd FTP server introduced a feature
that limits the number of connections from a single host. If we update a running
vsftpd server of an earlier version to version 1.1.2, one of the desired properties of
the server after being updated is that the number of connections from a single host
will never exceed the maximal connection number.
Behavior-level correctness is equally important, compared with code-level cor-
rectness. Behavior-level correctness focuses on how the behavior of systems to be
updated is aﬀected by updating, while code-level correctness focuses on the imple-
mentation of updates. Obviously, behavior-level correctness depends on the code-
level correctness, while code-level correctness is not enough to guarantee behavior-
level correctness. That is, even if an update is correctly applied to a running system
(no code-level errors), the system after being updated may not behave as expected.
In the rest of this section, we give an example to show the behavior-level cor-
rectness of dynamic updates. We consider a dynamic update to a system running a
ﬂawed mutual exclusion protocol (called protocol A for convenience) with a correct
one (protocol B). After being updated the system executes the correct protocol. We
design an update approachS, and perform it in relaxed consistency model.
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The basic idea of protocol A and B is that there is a shared Boolean variable
locked indicating whether critical section is available. Each process waits at the
pre-critical section (ps) to enter the critical section (cs) until locked becomes false.
It sets locked true, and enters the critical section. It sets locked false when it is
leaving the critical section. The diﬀerence is that in protocol A checking the value
of locked and setting locked true are two separate operations, while in protocol B
they are treated as an atomic one. It is well-known that protocol A does not satisfy
the mutual exclusion property.
We consider a dynamic update to force a system that is running protocol A
to evolve to executing protocol B. The update is performed in relaxed consistency
model, as depicted in Fig. 2. There are multiple processes in the old system
executing protocol A. At some moment the system is interrupted, and update is
performed. The value of locked in protocol B (denoted by lockedB) is assigned
with the value of locked in protocol A (denoted by lockedA) in the state where
interruption takes place. Then, the system is resumed. If a process is at the
remainder section rsA in protocol A, it stops executing protocol A and instead
evolves to executing protocol B from the beginning rsB. Otherwise, the process
will continue to execute protocol A until it returns back to the remainder section.
After all processes evolve, the update is completed. All processes run protocol B
thereafter. From that moment, the system is supposed to satisfy mutual exclusion
property. In Section 4, we will prove that the property indeed holds. However, we
also ﬁnd a counterexample showing that the system after being updated may cause
deadlock. In that sense, the update cannot be considered as behaviorally correct.
3 Formalizations of dynamic updates
In formal methods, software systems are typically formalized as transition systems,
consisting of a set S of states and a binary relation →⊆ S × S of transitions.
Observational transition system (OTS) is a variant of transition systems represented
in algebraic form. An OTS S is a triple 〈O, I, T 〉, consisting of a set O of observers,
I initial states, and T transitions. Each state is identiﬁed by the values returned
by each observer in O. Two states υ1, υ2 are equal if each observer returns the same

































Fig. 2. A dynamic update from protocol A to B
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state. For each t ∈ T , t(υ, . . .) is also a state, where . . . denotes other arguments.
More details about the deﬁnition and applications of OTS can be referred to [19].
We view a dynamic updating to a running system as a process of evolving from
an old running system to the new target system. The evolution can be divided
into three steps. In interrupt model and relaxed consistency model, the three steps
are: interrupting old system, updating when conditions are met, and resuming
the system. In invoke model, they are notifying to invoke update, calling update
procedure, and returning from the call. Generally, we consider them as preparing,
updating, and ﬁnishing. The three steps divide the whole evolution from old system
to new one into four phases, i.e., pre-updating, waiting for updating, updated, and
post-updating, as depicted by Fig. 3. During pre-updating phase, the old system is
executing. In invoke model, it continues running during waiting phase, but stops
in other two models. Update is performed when certain conditions are satisﬁed in
the waiting phase. After being updated, the evolution proceeds to updated phase,
where the system waits to be resumed (in interrupt and relaxed consistency model),
or for the return from update procedure (in invoke model). The system then goes
into post-updating phase, where some delayed updates may be performed. Finally
the system evolves to the new one.
We declare an observer to represent the four phases, and formalize the
three steps by three transitions. Let U be a set of four phase names, i.e.,
{pre-updating, waiting, updated, post-updating}. We declare an observer phase,
which returns the phase of the evolution in given state. The three steps are de-
ﬁned by three transitions prepare, update, and finish. We take the deﬁnition of
prepare for example. One condition that prepare happens in a state υ is that υ
is in pre-updating phase, i.e., phase(υ) = pre-updating. After prepare happens,
the evolution goes into waiting phase. Namely, the value of phase in prepare(υ) is
waiting.
A dynamic update can be formalized by the union of two OTSs that represent
the old and new systems with the three transitions and the observer. Suppose
that the old and new systems are formalized by two OTSs So and Sn such that
So = 〈Oo, Io, To〉 and Sn = 〈On, In, Tn〉. An update from So to Sn can be formalized
by Su = 〈Ou, Iu, Tu〉, where:
• Ou  Oo ∪ On ∪ {phase}
• Iu  {υ0|υ0 ∈ Io ∧ phase(υ0) = pre-updating}
• Tu  To ∪ Tn ∪ {prepare, update, finish}
time
prepare update ﬁnish
pre-updating waiting updated post-updating
old system new (with old) system
phase
action
is running interrupted otherwise
running in invoke mode
is running
Fig. 3. Four-phase system evolution by dynamic updating
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We assume that Oo ∩On = ∅ and To ∩ Tn = ∅. The assumption can be achieved by
renaming the observers and transitions if their intersections are not empty. Transi-
tions in To can take place in pre-updating and post-updating phase, while those in
Tn only take place in post-updating phase. Transitions in Tn begin from the state
where the old system evolves.
We consider the formalization of the dynamic update from protocol A to B
as an example. A part of the OTS is graphically shown in Fig. 4. Each circle
denotes a state. The values in each state that are aﬀected by transitions are given
beside circles. For instance, (pcA[p] : rs) denotes that in the state process p is at the
remainder section in protocol A. Each arrow denotes a transition with the transition
name and appropriate arguments. For instance, (enterA, p) denotes process p enters
the critical section. The OTS is a union of the two OTSs that formalize the protocol
A and B respectively. It includes the three transitions formalizing the updating
process and a transition evolve formalizing the evolution of each process in the
post-updating phase.
4 Speciﬁcation and Veriﬁcation
We can specify OTSs and verify their desired properties by existing algebraic lan-
guages and veriﬁcation systems. CafeOBJ is such a language in which OTSs are
tailored to be speciﬁed [19]. CafeOBJ is also a powerful rewrite system which is
often used as a proof assistant [8]. We can also translate CafeOBJ speciﬁcations
of OTSs into Maude [23], a sibling algebraic language of CafeOBJ but supporting
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Fig. 4. A graphical OTS of the dynamic update from protocol A to B
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4.1 Veriﬁcation by theorem proving
In CafeOBJ, objects are classiﬁed by sorts. A sort denotes a kind of objects. For
instance, sort Bool denotes a class of Boolean values true and false, which are
represented by two constants true and false of Bool. In this paper, we use sorts
Sys, Pid and Label to denote the classes of system states, processes, and program
counters such as rs, ps, and cs (which are represented by constants rs, ps, and cs
respectively).
Observers and transitions are represented by operators. For instance, transition
waitA is declared by op wait-A : Sys Pid -> Sys, where op is a keyword to
declare operators. The meaning of operators is deﬁned by equations. We take the
equation deﬁned for wait-A and pc-A for example.
ceq pc-A(wait-A(S,I),J) = (if I = J then ps else pc-A(S,J) fi)
if c-wait-A(S,I) .
S is a variable of Sys; I and J are variables of Pid. Keyword ceq is used to declare
a conditional equation.
The CafeOBJ speciﬁcations of OTSs are used to prove invariant properties by
proof scores [11]. We ﬁrst specify the property to be proved and then compose the
proof score by using CafeOBJ interactively as a proof assistant.
We prove that the system after being updated by the approach in Section 2.2
satisﬁes the mutual exclusion property, i.e., for any two processes p1, p2 in P and
each state υ in Υ, pcB(υ, p1) = cs and pcB(υ, p2) = cs imply that p1 = p2. That is,
in any state where there are two evolved processes at the critical section, they must
be the same one. The mutual exclusion property can be represented by a predicate
mu, which is declared and deﬁned as follows:
op mu : Sys Pid Pid -> Bool
eq mu(S,I,J) = (pc-B(S,I) = cs and pc-B(S,J) = cs) implies I = J .
We successfully proved by CafeOBJ that the system after being updated indeed
satisﬁes the mutual exclusion property. The proof is based on structural induction.
Three lemmas are needed in the proof. We omit the details of the proof due to the
limit of space.
4.2 Veriﬁcation by model checking
However, some properties may fail to be satisﬁed by an updated system. In that
situation, counterexamples of the properties are desired to refute the properties
being veriﬁed. We can specify OTSs in Maude as rewrite theories and model check
them with desired properties.
In Maude, states of OTSs are speciﬁed by sets of values. Each value is
represented as a component and a set of components is called a conﬁgura-
tion. For instance, each state in SI consists of Boolean values of lockedA
and lockedB, a value that denotes the phase of update, the values of pcA
and pcB for each process, and Boolean values denoting if corresponding pro-
cesses have evolved. We consider an instance of the system with two pro-
cesses p1 and p2. p1 and p2 are represented by two constants p1 and p2
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of Pid. A state is represented by a conﬁguration which is of the pattern
(locked-A:)(locked-B:)(phase:)(pc-A[p1]:)(pc-A[p2]:)(pc-B
[p1]:)(pc-B[p2]:)(evolved[p1]:)(evolved[p2]:), where each  holds
a corresponding value in a speciﬁc state, and components are concatenated by an
empty associative and commutative operator.
Transitions are represented by rewrite rules. For instance, transition update can
be speciﬁed by the following rewrite rule:
rl [update] (locked-A : B) (locked-B : B’) (phase : waiting) =>
(locked-A : B) (locked-B : B) (phase : updated) .
Keyword rl is used to declare a rule. Following rl is the name of the rule. B
and B’ are variables of Bool. The left-hand side is a pattern. Any conﬁguration or
a segment (a subset of components in a conﬁguration) that matches the pattern can
be rewritten by the rule. The right-hand side is the result into which the pattern is
rewritten. Other transitions can be speciﬁed as rewrite rules likewise.
As an example, we use the Maude LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) model checker
[7] to verify the deadlock freedom property of the system when it is updated from
protocol (A) to (B). Because model checking requires the system’s state space to
be ﬁnite, we make it ﬁnite by ﬁxing the number of processes in the system. We
consider the case when there are only two processes in the system, which is speciﬁed
in above section.
We ﬁrst specify the deadlock freedom property as an LTL formula. Deadlock
in the system with two processes means that both the two processes are at the re-
mainder section when they are executing protocol (B) but the value of lockB is true.
Neither of them can enter the critical section. We declare two proposition construc-
tors @rs? and locked?. Given a process I and a conﬁguration, @rs?(I) is true if
the conﬁguration contains (pc-B[I]: rs), and false otherwise. locked? is true if a
conﬁguration contains (locked-B : true), and false otherwise. The deadlock free-
dom property is deﬁned by the formula []~ @rs?(p1) /\ @rs?(p2) /\ locked?,
where [] corresponds to the global operator G in LTL, ~ to ¬, and /\ to ∧.
Maude returns a counterexample which violates the formula. The counterexam-
ple is shown in Fig. 5. Each circle represents a conﬁguration, and an arrow denotes
the name of the rule applied. We only show those components in each conﬁguration
changed by the rule. There is a path from the initial state denoted by c0 to the






































Fig. 5. A counterexample of the deadlock freedom property of the dynamic update
From counterexamples we can learn why the desired properties fail and ﬁnd
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possible solutions to redesign the updates. For instance, the above counterexample
shows the reason why deadlock occurs is that the value of lockedB is set true when
update takes place. There are two possible solutions. One is to set an update point
where lockedA is false and perform the update in the invoke model. The other
choice is to force lockB to be false, regardless of the value of lockA when the update
takes place in the interrupt model.
5 Related Work
In an earlier study, Gupta et al. introduced the notion of validity to dynamic
updates [12]. Informally, an update is called valid if a reachable state in a new
system can be eventually reached from the state where the update takes place in
the old system. However, the deﬁnition of validity, as being observed by Hayden
et al., is both too restrictive and too permissive [13]. They proposed to deﬁne
the correctness of dynamic updates by the properties that are speciﬁc to concrete
dynamic updates [13]. In our work, we explicitly call the properties behavioral
properties, to diﬀerentiate them from the code-level properties.
There are multiple approaches to the formalization of dynamic updates. In [13],
dynamic updates are formalized by merging old and new versions of C programs
with a merging transformation. In [12], programs are viewed as state machines.
However, their approach is restricted to concrete program models, like the one in
[13]. Bierman et al. proposed an update calculus to formalize dynamic software up-
dating [4]. The calculus is ﬂexible and independent from program models. However,
they do not provide any veriﬁcation support based on their formalization. Stoyle et
al. proposed Proteus, a core calculus to model dynamic software updating [22]. But
they use it to check code-level correctness. Most of the above formalisms except
[4] are only applicable to the updates of single-threaded systems, but not to the
updates of distributed systems. Anderson has provided a deﬁnition of safe dynamic
updates for behavioral properties of concurrent programs [2]. However, only type
safety property is considered in the deﬁnition. In our approach, we focus on the
design of the old and new systems and updates, which makes our formalization
approach more general but not restricted to certain programming models.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have introduced a notion of behavioral correctness of dynamic updates, and
motivated the need of it with a concrete example. A dynamic update is called
behaviorally correct if expected behavior must happen after it is performed. We
proposed an algebraic methodology of specifying dynamic updates and verifying
their behavioral properties. The methodology can be applied to the formaliza-
tions of three dynamic updating models, which are widely implemented in dynamic
software updating systems. Unlike most of the existing formalizations of dynamic
updates, our methodology is not restricted to the dynamic updates developed in
certain program models. With our formalization methodology, we can verify the
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behavioral properties of dynamic updates using oﬀ-the-shelf theorem proving and
model checking tools. By veriﬁcation, we can prove the desired properties indeed
hold, or detect potential errors of dynamic updates and ﬁnd possible solutions to
them.
In ongoing work, we plan to apply our approach to the veriﬁcation of more com-
plicated dynamic updates. One candidate is the update from a ﬂawed authentica-
tion protocol NSPK (Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol) [18] to its modiﬁed
version NSLPK [15] (which has been veriﬁed to satisfy the mutual authentication
property). The property of interest is that after being updated, the system should
satisfy the mutual authentication property.
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